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INTRODUCTION 
Thinking About Memory 
This is a book about memory and everyday life in three 
societies that flourished more than one thousand years 
ago in what is now Honduras, including the Maya 
kingdom in the Copan valley and its neighbors in the 
Cuyumapa valley and at the site of Cerro Palenque in 
the lower Ulua river valley. The people who lived in 
these places left behind monumental buildings, intri-
cate works of art, fine examples of craftsmanship such 
as pottery, figurines, and stone tools, the remains of 
their dead, and the broken and discarded remnants of 
their daily life; but they left only a small body of writ-
ten records. My project may seem quixotic because of 
this, but my contention is that an archaeological study 
of memory in past societies such as these based largely 
on material remains is both possible and worthwhile. It 
is possible because memory is not just a faculty of the 
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individual mind operating in isolation but a social process of remembering 
and forgetting that is embedded in the materiality of human existence. It is a 
social practice intimately bound up in the relations people develop with one 
another and with the world around them through what they do, where and 
how they do it, and with whom or what—and results in physical traces that 
make up the archaeological record. It thus belongs with such processes as 
learning, knowing, and making sense of things, which have been produc-
tively studied by social anthropologists, philosophers, phenomenologists, 
semioticians, and psychologists and which, I argue, are susceptible to ar-
chaeological examination. 
It is a worthwhile project because discussing memory in a specific histori-
cal and cultural context, moreover one so emphatically "non-Western" as 
pre-Hispanic Mesoamerica, sheds light on the how and why of social mem-
ory itself. The project also offers a new perspective on the complex societies 
of Mexico and Central America that developed outside of the influence of 
Europe for millennia before the shock of conquest and colonization be-
ginning in the sixteenth century. These are societies that G. W. R Hegel 
(1975:152-96) dismissed as being not just outside history but incapable of 
progress. This view is contradicted by the words of the people themselves 
and by the work of archaeologists, historians, anthropologists, epigraphers, 
linguists, and art historians, which reveal much about the historical con-
sciousness of the Maya, Aztecs, and other groups native to the region. Yet the 
concept of history that permeates a great deal of this research is a restricted 
one. Approaches to Maya history during the Late to Terminal Classic peri-
ods, my focus here, have combined an intense engagement with art and 
hieroglyphic writing with a long-standing fascination with elite life to pro-
duce an overly narrow and fetishistic obsession with royalty. Shifting to a 
broader, theoretically more complex approach made possible by positing a 
more intimate and less disjunctive relationship between history and social 
memory, I am able to discuss how the "political economy of memory" 
(Melion and Kiichler 1991:30) plays out at different levels of society and 
among three distinctive neighboring societies that were part of the greater 
Maya world. 
Thinking about memory is also worthwhile precisely because I am work-
ing from the material remains to social context and questions of meaning, 
from physical residues to the actions and interactions that produced mem-
ory. I thus find myself challenged to reverse the analytical approach taken by 
much research on memory and related cognitive and social practices. These 
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Map I. Location of important sites in southeastern Mesoamerica. Drawn by Bill Nelson. 
bodies of research, developed from various disciplinary perspectives, con-
verge on their insistence that the ways through which people learn, remem-
ber, develop a sense of self, and understand are situated in social, spatial, 
temporal, and physical contexts. These contexts must be studied, not just 
set aside as complicating factors or background noise. Furthermore, these 
contexts are not only linguistic or discursive but also nonconceptual, based 
in action, and part of "the body's intelligent orientation to the world" (Car-
man 2005:71). 
Taking seriously the proposition that making meaning, remembering, 
learning, and knowing are linked acts that people engage in through prac-
tice, I focus on how people interact with one another and with the world 
around them in contexts that are localized in time and space. The relation-
ship between time and memory is obvious. Time's intimate connection to 
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space is often ignored. As Nancy Munn (1992:94) asserts, "In a lived world, 
spatial and temporal dimensions cannot be disentangled, and the two com-
mingle in various ways." I achieve this focus by subjecting the material 
culture itself to a concentrated scrutiny, resulting in an extended, creative, 
and fruitful engagement with the material remains of human endeavors. I 
draw on a panoply of analytical techniques and multiple lines of evidence, 
including what I can learn from the properties of the material remains 
themselves and what their spatial associations tell me about why and where 
people interacted. I also consider what kinds of comparisons I can draw with 
other groups from the information provided in documents produced from 
the sixteenth century to the eighteenth by Spanish and native writers as well 
as those produced by later explorers and ethnographers. Information con-
veyed through visual imagery and texts also adds to my understanding. 
As an archaeologist, I approach the study of memory as lived out through 
everyday life from an intensely material perspective. Archaeologists find 
themselves enmeshed in the materiality of two worlds, that in which they live 
and that of the past which they study. I start with a body of materials re-
covered from excavations in and around ancient houses. These include the 
spatial proximity of certain buildings and artifacts—remains of at least some 
of the things people made, used, exchanged, and interacted with—as well as 
a knowledge of where those artifacts were found and thus what associations 
exist between objects and space in the residential group. I take a set of 
physical things—tangible and capable of being excavated, measured, ana-
lyzed to determine the characteristics of their material properties, compared, 
and represented—and use them to explore the significance of memory for 
people living at Cerro Palenque, Copan, and Cuyumapa from the seventh 
century through the eleventh CE, when their societies were at their largest 
and most diverse.The communities of memory (Burke 1989) that develop 
through actions and interactions bind individuals, places, and material cul-
ture together over time and in the process create a sense of relational per-
sonhood.. Communities of memory are embedded in specific material do-
mains that engrain memory, knowledge, and subjectivity in the human body 
through actions and interactions with people and things in particular spatial 
settings. I consider how the experience of living daily life, burying the dead 
and storing things, crafting objects and transmitting knowledge, and ex-
changing goods and feasting-at home helped these people construct their 
particular histories and subjectivities. 
My focus is on what people do at home as they live out their day-to-day 
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life. I ask, How does everyday life become a locus of memory? Through the 
argument I present in this book I demonstrate how practices of everyday life 
in Copan, Cerro Palenque, and Cuyumapa turn domestic spaces into places 
of memory with important consequences for the production of social differ-
ence, the entrenchment of social hierarchies, and the ability of some to exert 
control over others. The multiple memory communities in these societies 
may be in competition or disagreement with one another or with the effort 
by some to produce a more encompassing and larger-scale totality through 
public acts of commemoration. The presence of multiple communities built 
around memory and practice opens a way to understanding how a historical 
consciousness is made manifest in material culture, practice, and landscape. 
The ability of archaeology to discern associations among the built en' 
vironment, the natural landscape, artifacts, and the remains of the dead 
speaks directly to how materiality, embodiment, and the spatiality and tem-
porality of social life give meaning to people's actions and interactions at 
multiple social scales and in diverse settings. Archaeological materials and 
contexts recovered from excavation in living areas in Cerro Palenque, Copan, 
and Cuyumapa attest to the repetition of actions that involved more than one 
person, were carried out with and through things, and were productive of 
interaction. Archaeologists have typically divided these actions into those 
related to daily life, those with economic significance, those relating to 
ritual, and so on. The usefulness of these essentially functional distinctions 
is not great when one considers identity to be relational and intersubjective, 
although many archaeologists, like historians and cultural anthropologists, 
have given a greater role to ritual and commemoration than to the everyday 
in the production of memory. I find this emphasis debatable and explain why 
in the course of this book. 
I cannot discern the actions and relations of any specific person. Archae-
ological data are too coarse grained to pretend to such ethnographic particu-
larity. The hieroglyphic inscriptions created by the Maya living in the Copan 
valley might seem to offer hope of a more biographical insight. These carved 
and painted texts, mostly concentrated in one area of the settlement, have 
been used to produce lists of rulers and to identify a limited set of politically 
significant acts by royalty and a few favored relatives or noble supporters 
(see W. Fash 2001; Martin and Grube 2000; Stuart 2005). These documents 
serve the political purpose of reinforcing the authority of the king and his 
family, who deliberately limited which events and which people to record. 
They also determined when events should be memorialized, often preferring 
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to create retrospective accounts on monuments erected long after the mo-
ment when the event took place (Grube 2006). From my perspective, there-
fore, they give insight into how one memory community attempts to per-
petuate the memory of certain events and people through inscription in a 
permanent medium. 
UNBUNDLING MEMORY 
In Maya sculpture, women of high rank may hold large bundles tied up in 
cloth. Sometimes the bundle is shown with the wrapping folded back to 
reveal its contents: a clay bowl holding bark paper and sharp stone knives 
used to let blood as an offering to ancestors and deities (see Joyce 1993b, 
1996). When I state that memory can be approached as embodied and situ-
ated intersubjective social practices of remembering and forgetting inti-
mately bound up with the materiality of the world around us, I have pre-
sented readers of this book with the textual equivalent of that bundle. 
If memory were indeed something that could be taken out of an offering 
bowl and turned around in one's hands, one would discover that memory 
takes on a different shape depending on the angle of view. One way scholars 
have tried to understand memory is by making a distinction between individ-
ual and social memory. From this angle, memory is seen as both a faculty 
possessed by individual people and a property of social groups or larger 
collectivities such as society. This also creates a seemingly neat division of 
labor between disciplines that study the individual and individual memory, 
such as psychology, the cognitive sciences, or biography, and those, in-
cluding sociology, anthropology, and social history, that concentrate on the 
groups, structures, institutions, and beliefs that form society and culture. 
Whether one wishes to argue for the primacy of one of these forms of 
memory over the other or for their complementary coexistence, individual 
and social memory are taken to be a dualitythat separates memory into two 
disparate things. Research on the individual, however, has increasingly had 
to come to grips with the social, while research on the social has discovered 
it risks reifying abstractions if it ignores the individual. 
THE SOCIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL MEMORY 
The study of memory-as an individual faculty or a property of an indi-
vidual mind may seem at first glance the obvious way to approacrrthe sub-
ject. From this perspective, contemplative activity is inside of people, it is 
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Royal Maya man [left) and woman (right) from a stone lintel. The woman holds a bundle of 
ritual paraphernalia. Drawing, YAX: Lnt. 5 from Corpus of Maya Hieroglyphic Inscriptions, 
Vol. 3, Part 1, Yaxchilan, reproduced courtesy of the President and Fellows of Harvard College. 
"intrapsychic," and thus "our only knowledge of reality comes through the 
representations we have formed within ourselves" (Taylor 2005:26), which 
must be stored and retrieved in some manner. A very old model of how this 
happens has been reconstructed by Frances Yates (1966) in her history of 
classical, medieval, and Renaissance arts of artificial memory. The anony-
mous author of Ad Herennium (ca. 86-82 BCE) instructs his rhetoric students 
that they can become better orators by learning the techniques of artificial 
memory, the invention of which is attributed to the poet Simonides of Ceos 
(ca. 556-468 BCE). Endorsed by Cicero and Quintilian, the art was said to 
help orators improve their ability to remember words, facts, images, and all 
the things necessary to deliver long, complicated speeches. The approach 
relies on a system of storage and retrieval that is entirely mental and inten-
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tional. A person creates a set of associations in his mind between what he 
wants to remember and a series of places (loci) and images that are vivid but 
not necessarily based on some real-world example already known to the 
person. This process is not only intrapsychic but resolutely unsocial: "It is 
better to form one's memory loci in a deserted and solitary place for crowds 
of passing people tend to weaken the impressions. Therefore the student 
intent on acquiring a sharp and well-defined set of loci will choose an unfre-
quented building in which to memorise places" (Yates 1966:7). 
Revived in the thirteenth century by Albertus Magnus and Thomas 
Aquinas, the art of artificial memory, in its medieval practice influenced by 
the rediscovery of Aristotle, took on a moral tone as memory became an 
aspect of Prudence, one of the cardinal virtues, rather than a technique of 
rhetoric. Yates (1966:78-79) suggests that the Scholastics' recognition of 
the value of images to memory and more generally to the ability to ap-
prehend spiritual matters may in part explain why visual imagery of religious 
subjects expands during this period. Images and places that the Roman 
students of rhetoric each held in their mind, in their individualized and 
imaginary memory palaces, have now become something that can be viewed 
and used by others in the form of paintings and frescos. During the Renais-
sance, the art of memory was taken up by the Neoplatonists, who continued 
the process of externalization, embodied most strikingly in Giulio Camillo's 
theater of memory. (Or at least it would have been if the wonderful project 
Yates describes had ever been finished and put into operation.) 
More modern attempts to model how natural memory works turn out to 
mirror this shift from interior to exterior processes and from the individual 
in isolation to the individual as enmeshed in relations with other people and 
with things. Memory has been modeled as a set of mental operations based 
on the application of rules that are consciously applied by "a computer-brain 
isolated in the skull" (Fisette 2003:56). Such computational and represen-
tational models have become increasingly unsatisfactory, however, as the 
importance of dynamic interaction between individual cognitive processes 
and "content, context, environment and social setting" (Hirst and Manier 
1995:108) has become more and more apparent (Gallagher.and Varela 2003; 
Heath and Luff 2000; Kuchler 2005). In other words, the notion of individual 
atoms of humanity sitting all alone doing something called remembering 
has become increasingly untenable as a way of approaching memory. 
Social psychologists have emphasized how talking about events plays 
an important role in an individual's ability to remember experiences and 
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feelings—and in their ability to forget (Pennebaker and Banasik 1997). At 
this point, we are moving from the intrapsychic to the interpersonal. The 
processes going on "inside people's heads" are thoroughly entrenched in 
and inseparable from the world in which people live and which they con-
struct through their action (Lave 1993; Wenger 1998). Memories are created 
as much as they are retrieved through such practices as storytelling, conver-
sation, participation in activities of daily life or ceremonies, visual cues, 
associations with objects or places external to ourselves, and the repetition 
of actions that perpetuate a sense of relationship (Boone 1994a; Connerton 
1989; Fentress and Wickham 1992; Leibsohn 1994; Melion and Kuchler 1991; 
Muriuki 2002; Petrov 1989; Rappaport rggo). 
This phenomenon makes it possible for individuals to feel they remem-
ber events, they did not experience or know people they have never met 
(Halbwachs 1994). Visiting London for the first time, Maurice Halbwachs 
has the sense that he knows the city, even parts that may no longer exist. His 
memories are based on the novels he read as a child and on conversations he 
had with friends who live there (Halbwachs 1997:52-53). Halbwachs is 
immersed in the palimpsest (Bender 1998) that is the complex urban land-
scape through which the past becomes part of a particular present enacted as 
the visitor experiences the city as social space (Lefebvre 1991b). Thus, the 
anxiety we seem to feel about whether memories are real or really our own 
stems in large part from a disjunction between a particular model, one might 
even say ideology, of memory and how remembering actually occurs. In The 
Autobiography of Goethe. Truth and Poetry: From My Oum Life (Aus meinem Leben: 
Dichtumj und Wahrheit), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1891:2-3) writes, 
When we desire to recall what befel [sic] us in the earliest period of youth, 
it often happens that we confound what we have heard from others with 
that which we really possess from our own direct experience. Without, 
therefore, instituting a very close investigation into the point, which after 
all could lead to nothing . . . our family liked to tell of all sorts of 
waggeries to which I was enticed by [the neighbors].. . . One fine after-
noon, . . . I . . . hurled [a pot] into the street. The [neighbors] . . . cried 
out, "Another." I was not long in flinging out a pot; a n d , . . . by degrees 
the whole collection, platters, pipkins, mugs and all, were dashed upon 
the pavement 
We remember through other people's statements about past events—in ef-
fect, we learn to remember. Like Halbwachs wandering the streets of Lon-
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don in the company of a long-dead author, Goethe in his memoir illustrates 
the degree to which remembering is a social act. He asks whether the pot-
throwing incident was "a real memory," something he knows from "direct 
experience," but then decides it does not matter. Given how psychologists 
have shown that memories are not merely stored in the individual mind 
waiting to be retrieved but are instead developed through interaction and 
social relations, this question is not answerable and attempting to do so 
"could lead to nothing." 
The distinction between poetry, fiction, or imagination (Dichtuna) and 
truth, fact, or reality (Wahrheit) is ultimately irresolvable—if we assume that 
true or truthful memories can exist only through individual recall by Goethe 
as an autonomous, self-referential subject responsible for "his" memories. 
Goethe a^s a participant in intersubjective relations with others, however, 
contributes to the production of a sociable memory, the validity and value of 
which depend on more than just his contribution. 
WHAT IS SOCIAL MEMORY? 
The study of social memory reverses the analytical arrow. It takes some 
social group or society itself as its starting point and considers how memory 
can transcend the life span or mental capacity of the individual. Just as 
studies that begin with the individual had to find a way to move beyond the 
particularity of intrapsychic mental processes, so studies that start with 
society had to find a way to reincorporate people into social memory. 
Halbwachs, profoundly influenced by Emile Durkheim, published his 
work on collective memory in 1925, thereby opening the way for the study of 
memory separate from the psychological focus on the individual (Coser 
1992; Halbwachs 1992,1994; Hutton 1993:77-90). By positing that "mem-
ory depends on the social environment," Halbwachs (1992:37) argued that 
the social groups with which a person interacts become the primary locus 
for recalling memories. Memory is more than an activity of an individual 
mind because it is the social context that determines how and why memories 
are recalled, recognized as important, and connected to places and events. 
Memories are not always there in a person's mind or immediately accessible 
but must be made to recur through social interaction. 
The value of memory interlocutors is apparent in Vladimir Nabokov's 
description of how he revised his autobiography. The first edition had been 
written while he was isolated geographically and emotionally from his fam-
ily and did not have access to materials that would confirm his remem-
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brances. Years later, he traveled to Europe and renewed ties with his rela-
tives: "At these family reunions, Speak, Memory was-judged. Details of date 
and^circumstance were checked, and it was found that in many cases I had 
erred, or had not examined deeply enough an obscure but fathomable recol-
lection. Certain matters were dismissed by my advisers as legends or rumors 
or, if genuine, proved to be related to [other] events or periods. . . . Both 
my sisters angrily remonstrated against my description of the journey to 
Biarritz... and by pelting me with specific details convinced me I had been 
wrong in leaving them behind" (Nabokov 1966:14). 
Remembering is thus a* process of reconstruction or even construction, 
not merely preservation. Groups endorse a past that makes sense in light of 
present circumstances and attitudes. From this perspective, one should ask 
why Goethe's parents considered the dish smashing worthy of being remem-
bered—of becoming part of their family's history—and how this memory 
shaped Goethe's relations with his parents, sister, and their neighbors. 
The recognition by Goethe that our memories combine what we have 
been told with what we have experienced is certainly very close to the recent 
shift in emphasis among some psychologists toward a recognition of the 
social context of remembering. Halbwachs, however, emphasized the col-
lective over the individual, taking such social formations as families, social 
classes, and religions as abstract entities that exist independently of any 
particular individual and can be said to possess an identity of their own. By 
identifying a variety of collectivities that serve as loci of collective memory, 
Halbwachs stressed that people are members of several groups, including 
more than one family through marriage or other social ties, but also com-
munity, social class, ethnicity, and they contribute to memory making in 
multiple contexts in which different memories are salient. This process 
leads to the creation of diverse bodies of memories that may be deployed by 
groups as they assert connections or differentiate themselves. 
Theanger of Nabokov's sisters at having been written out of the trip to 
Biarritz illustrates one of the criticisms leveled at Halbwachs: that he was 
indifferent to the possibility of conflict or disagreement in the process of 
reconstructing a past (Burke 1989; Cole 2001; Connerton 1989). A shared 
past is not derived solely from processes characterized by social solidarity 
and communication that are untainted by relations of power and differences 
in authority (Best and Kellner 1991). His lack of attention to this issue must 
be recognized but does not vitiate the value of his two main insights, which 
have proved productive for research on social and individual memory. One is 
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that memories are made, not just retrieved, and that memory making is uiork, 
requiring not just remembering but also forgetting, debating, learning, rec-
onciling or suppressing differences, and engaging across time and space 
with other people and ideas. The other is that groups of people that habitu-
ally interact furnish a prime opportunity for the work of memory making to 
go forward. 
Since Halbwachs, the term social memory has become widely adopted as an 
alternative to as well as an expansion of his concept of collective mem-
ory. Social memory, it is argued, allows greater awareness of the individual 
(Crane 1997; Fentress and Wickham 1992) and expresses a sense of dissatis-
faction with the Durkheimian notion of the collective (Cole 2001; Connerton 
1989; Handler 1994). Nevertheless, it generally places greater emphasis on 
the social, that is to say, the group aspect of socially meaningful remember-
ing, than on the individual. 
Social memory has certainly become a widely evoked concept (see Canuto 
and Yaeger 2000; Van Dyke and Alcock 2003; Williams 2003; and Mills and 
Walker 2008 for recent archaeological applications). In a thoughtful at-
tempt to characterize what they call "social memory studies," Jeffrey Olick 
and Joyce Robbins sum up this multiplicity of approaches and perspectives 
as a "nonparadigmatic, transdisciplinary, centerless enterprise" (1998:106). 
Maria Cattell and Jacob Climo (2002:4) g° s o f a r a s to suggest that social 
memory is something "impossible to define" but that "we seem to recognize 
it when we see it." This rather startling alignment of social memory with 
pornography implies that at least some of the difficulty-results from the 
reification of social memory as a static object (an "it") with commonly held 
properties regardless of context. 
MEMORY AND IDENTITY 
One's perspective on the memory bundle from this angle highlights the 
connection between memory and identity, which is widely held to be central 
both to the individual sense of self and to the group sense of coherence that 
makes people members of something larger (Burke 1989; Gillis 1994; Le 
Goffigg2). As an analytical concept, identity has been divided into the same 
two parts as memory: either it is something inherent in the individual person 
or it is a property of collectivities, groups that can be treated as a kind of 
individual writ large and clearly separable from other groups, just as individ-
uals are distinct from one another physically and psychically. Writing on the 
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relationship between memory and identity, Richard Handler suggests that 
one view social groups as situational and symbolic, "constituted and recon-
stituted through historical action" (1994:29). What we call social groups 
are neither merely agglomerations xjf individuals nor unchanging collec-
tivities but practice-based sets of relationships and contexts for interaction 
and action, marked by varying degrees of participation and understanding 
that "inevitably subsume hostility and amity, rivalry and solidarity" (Jack-
son 1998:14). These relations are intersubjective but not always harmoni-
ous, as some approaches to intersubjectivity assume (Best and Kellner 1991; 
Smolka, de Goes, and Pino 1995). Any surface impression of integration and 
collectivity is the product of a great deal of work by the group's members. 
Handler's analysis of identity has important implications for our under-
standing of memory. It argues that society is less a clearly bounded and 
integrated totality encompassing equally bounded and stable groups than a 
shifting congeries of relations and groupings. His suggestion does not lead 
back to an isolated atom of individualism. It recognizes that people do group 
themselves (or are grouped by others) into and consider themselves to be 
members of something longer lived and larger than any individual but asks 
one to be aware of the historical circumstances through which these groups 
come to be and which help explain why they matter. In this book I focus on 
how the Maya at Copan and their neighbors at Cerro Palenque and in the 
Cuyumapa valley formed themselves into social groups that endure over time 
through practice. One such group I am interested in is created through the 
sharing of domestic space and participation in the activities of daily life. As 
will become apparent, some of these domestic spaces were quite large and 
were home to larger numbers of people than we associate with domestic 
groups in contemporary society. This variation in size and scale reflects the 
fact that some households are longer lived than others, the greater time 
depth of their personal history resulting in a more substantial physical pres-
ence. It also may be related to differences in wealth (frequently the result of 
accumulation over time) and reflective of differences in social status. Despite 
this variation, certain fundamental kinds of actions and interactions emerge 
as integral to daily life in these societies. 
Handler's ideas align with practice-centered approaches that argue that 
abstractions such as society, social groups, the individual or gender, power, 
economy do not have a prior existence that is reflected in and determining of 
relations and actions but are in fact constructed over and over again through 
these practices (Bell 1992; Bourdieu 1977, 1990,1998; Farnell 1999; Keane 
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1995, 1997; Lovell 2000; D. Miller 1987, 2005; Moore 1994; Sawicki 1994; 
Weedon 1997; Wenger 1998). I see the significance for memory this way: 
accepting, as I do, the close connection between identity and memory, once 
the one (identity) becomes something recreated over time (historical and 
symbolic), then so does the other. In other words, memory is also some-
thing reconstituted over time in particular contexts. Social memory does not 
enshrine a collective narrative of events so much as it becomes a process 
through which people bring the past into the present. 
MEMORY, HISTORY, AND MODERNITY 
Shifting the memory bundle yet again reveals another set of issues, that 
of the relationship between memory and history. Any attempt to consider 
memory in diverse, cultural and historical contexts must come to grips with 
an intellectual framework that has characterized the modern and the post-
modern as different from preceding periods of European history (such as the 
medieval), rural society (peasants), and the non-Western..The modern and 
the postmodern (or the late modern) become stages in human world his-
tory and particular kinds of social formations that are also geographically 
and philosophically Western (Best and Kellner 1991; Harvey 1990; Lovibond 
1993; Piot 1999; Poster 1997; Rabinow 1994). This condition corresponds to 
what Michel-Rolphe Trouillot (1991) calls the "savage slot," also known as 
the primitive, the traditional, the premodern, and the archaic, and appar-
ently necessary to the self-definition of the Western philosophical subject as 
the sole possessor of history and culture capable of progress (Hegel 1975). 
Mesoamerican societies before European contact, like those of Africa and 
other parts of the non-Western world, are a large part of the conventionally 
defined premodern or traditional counterpart that provides the implicit com-
parison point against which modern life differentiates itself (Giddens 1981, 
1990). The premodern is not so much a temporal division as a marker of 
difference based on assumptions about history, change, complexity, and 
evolution. The problem is not the recognition of the existence of cultural and 
historical difference fundamental to an anthropological project such as this 
one. It is how differences between groups labeled modern and premodern, 
Western and non-Western, have been framed and how they have been unre-
flectively absorbed into discussions of history and memory. 
Premodern or traditional societies are supposed to laclc historical con-
sciousness, rely on myth for explanation, and be subject to the unconscious 
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force of custom (Burke 2002; Rappaport 1990; Sweetinan 2003; Trouillot 
iggi). Some have gone so far as to argue that there is a primitive or pre-
modern kind of mind that differs in its cognitive abilities because of these 
disparate conditions. These assumptions permeate a range of literature in 
anthropology, psychology, sociology, economics, and history. They emerge 
in the attempt to oppose oral and literate cultures and the role and nature 
of memory in them (Connerton 1989; Goody 1986; Le Goffigg2; Hutton 
igg3; cf. Halverson 1992; Houston 2004; Parmentier 1987; Rappaport iggo; 
Rosaldo 1980; Schottler iggs). Premodern or traditional people have mem-
ory, moderns have history. When Jacques Le Goff(igg2:g8) takes memory to 
be one of the objects of history, he assumes there is some coherent thing 
identifiable as memory that can not only be studied but also usefully con-
trasted to two things both called history—a critical, analytical mode of in-
quiry or the series of events and circumstances that make up the history of a 
people (see also Hutton I9g3; Nora 1996). Other historians collapse the two, 
arguing that history is social memory (Archibald 2002; Burke ig8g). 
An example of the opposing of memory and history may be found in 
Pierre Nora's introduction to his collaborative work on French history and 
identity. The example is appropriate because some archaeologists have em-
braced Nora's organizing concept, lieux de memoire, translated in an early 
version of his introduction as "sites of memory" (Nora 1989; see Alcock 
2001; Holtorf 1997; Knapp and Ashmore 1999; Mills and Walker 2008; Mo-
shenska 2007). The attractiveness of the English-language rendering of the 
phrase to an archaeologist is obvious. Not only does it incorporate a com-
mon term in the discipline but it seems to refer to something .spatial and 
physical, the very essence of what archaeology studies. Monuments and 
other large-scale, enduring, visible constructions have been labeled sites 
of memory. 
In his introduction to the later English-language edition of the work 
published under Nora's direct supervision, however, Nora notes that there is 
no "precise English equivalent" for ± e term and, as a result, asked the 
translator to "keep the French expression whenever possible, while sub-
stituting place or site only when these English words seem to capture the 
sense adequately" (Nora 1996: fh 1). Although the lieux de memoire that loom 
large in the French national consciousness include monuments, they also 
encompass ideas, songs, books, fictional characters, and institutions. 
More problematic for an archaeological study of social memory and his-
torical consciousness in a particular cultural context is the degree to which 
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the uncritical adoption of the concept carries with it acceptance of a specific 
i perspective on the relationship between memory and history, so-called tradi-
tional and modern societies, that is part and parcel of the supposed disjunc-
tion between societies with and without history. For Nora, lieux de memoire 
contrast with mileux de memoire. In fact, lieux de memoire exist in modern 
France only because "there are no longer any mileux de memoire, settings in 
which memory is a real part of everyday experience" (Nora igg6:i). Peasants, 
that surviving remnant of premodern thinking in the West, were the last to 
inhabit mileux de memoire. If these mileux still held sway, the French (or anyone 
living in modern or postmodern times) would not need lieux de memoire 
because it would not be necessary to create external markers to force remem-
bering. In fact, there would be no history. All acts "would be experienced... 
as a religious repetition of sempiternal practices" (1996:2). Memory, if one 
can even call it that, is undifferentiated wallowing in ritual; history is critical 
analysis of something outside of one's own experience. Our problem, ac-
cording to Nora, is that modern society has acquired a historical conscious-
ness but has not yet freed itself from memory. Therefore, we still need the 
crutch of something specific, whether concrete or imaginary, to serve as a 
memory marker. If we recognize historical consciousness as a universal yet 
culturally constructed category rather than a symptom or development of 
modernity, however, the distinction between mileux and lieux is meaningless, 
just as it makes no sense to argue that traditional societies have no history. 
In fact, to say that moderns (and only moderns) have history implies at 
least three things: first, that moderns, which includes us, the contemporary 
analysts of ancient societies, are the only ones capable of recognizing that 
there is a difference between past and present which allows events to be 
defined by their temporal occurrence; second, that we have the right kinds of 
records, records that allow us to reconstruct past, or historical, events; and, 
third, that we construct narratives about the past with the goal of explaining 
causes or origins as well as preserving the knowledge of historical events 
(Parmentier 1987). Because we live in a society so wedded to a particular 
definition of history it is difficult for many of us to grasp the possibility that 
remembering over time can occur without a specific kind of historical record 
or evidence, the written text This oversight allows us to label some societies 
as being without history and as lacking even the ability to think historically. 
From this perspective, social memory raises the specter of inaccuracy, at 
best, and fabrication, at worst. Thus Richard Bradley, commenting on the 
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chapters in Archaeologies a/Memory, worries about the "progressive distortion 
of history" (2003^223) over time in societies without writing, even when 
material markers like monuments exist that function as temporal referents. 
Similar worries may be discerned in the valorization of Maya documents 
dating from before the Spanish conquest. The texts that have survived (only 
a portion of what once existed) are most commonly carved on stone monu-
ments, painted on pottery, or incised on portable objects made of jade, 
obsidian, bone, turtle shell, and other materials. Although their existence 
has been extensively documented since the nineteenth century, their transla-
tion proved difficult, and it is only in the past twenty to thirty years that large 
numbers of texts have been translated and published (see Coe I9gg; Houston 
2000; Wichmann 2006).^Even now,.large gaps remain, and some readings 
are disputed. The growing body of information made available through 
an understanding of these texts has led some Mayanists to claim they are 
now engaged in a historical enterprise rather than an anthropological one— 
Mayanists should be historians and the Maya emerge as possessors of a true 
historical consciousness, that is to say, one that looks like a modern or 
Western one (Coe iggg; Fash and Sharer iggi; Houston 2000; Pyburn igg8). 
These claims have been countered by those who feel that the sequences of 
events revealed in the texts, especially those on stone monuments, do not 
come up to the standard of history because they contain inconsistencies that 
make it impossible to construct a single coherent historical narrative for any 
one kingdom, such as Copan, or for the Maya area as a whole. The texts are 
deliberately inaccurate because they are the result not of a dedication to 
recalling the true sequence of events but of politically motivated decisions 
designed to hide the truth when inconvenient and bolster the fortunes of 
certain royal families—making them propaganda, not history (see Marcus 
1992a, I9g2b, 2002). 
My approach is anthropological in that I argue that all societies have a 
sense of history but how they have defined the concept differs (Parmentier 
1987; Rappoport iggo; Riisen 2002). In other words, history is as susceptible 
to anthropological analysis as the family, the household, the economy, and 
other institutions: "In many other cultural realms.. . wide variations in form 
and content are acknowledged at the same time that family resemblances 
across cultures are recognized. Why should the sense of history be an excep-
tion to this general rule of anthropological analysis?" (Rosaldo ig8o:gi-g2). 
History is a universal but culturally constructed category that provides a way 
l8 INTRODUCTION 
for people to relate past, present, and future in a meaningful narrative that is 
expressed in various ways and takes various forms, not all of which mimic 
those we consider important or share the same concerns we do. 
It is not a question of distinguishing true memories from false or accu-
rate accounts from inaccurate ones but of trying to understand how and why 
people create connections in the present that are validated by a shared his-
tory. Who shares the history and what alternative histories coexist with one 
another, creating potential sources of conflict within or between societies? 
The Late Classic residents of Group 9N-8, one of the largest residential 
compounds in the Copan valley walked over the graves of at least eighty-
eight people who had been buried over fifteen hundred years earlier (Davis-
'Salazar 2007).1 By the time the later houses and associated buildings were 
built in the seventh century and the eighth CE, the collection of graves lay 
two meters below ground. Did the later residents of this compound know 
what was under their feet? What they knew and in what detail depends on 
what they considered worth remembering. Long-term retention of informa-
tion is attested in Mesoamerican societies that lack written records, as is an 
interest in ancient objects, which may be found in burials and as offerings 
(Hamann 2002; Joyce 2003).2 As I discuss in this book, the process of 
constructing social memory in Copan, Cerro Palenque, and the Cuyumapa 
valley involved, in part, an active engagement with buried remains of the 
dead and of valued objects. If, however, what mattered to the residents was 
their ability to claim in a more general sense that their forebears, whether 
directly related to the later inhabitants or not, were present because such a 
claim is sufficient to support a- genealogy based on a sense of long-term 
being in one place, then that is the kind of memory likely to.be cherished. 
TIME'S ARROW, TIME'S CYCLE 
Time—how it is measured and how it is understood—is taken to be a 
crucial difference between the modern and premodern or traditional mind 
that makes it impossible for traditional societies to be historical. Models of 
temporality underpin models ofhistorical consciousness and everyday life 
(Munn 1992). A basic tenet of temporal models that seek to differentiate 
between modern and premodern concepts of temporality is that a dichotomy 
exists in how the movement of time is understood. Stephen Jay Gould called 
the two parts of this dichotomy, time's arrow and time's cycle. These meta-
phors represent, two- different ideas about the ways in which time moves, 
ways that Western thought conceives of as dichotomous. 
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Time's arrow is "history [as] an irreversible sequence of unrepeatable 
events. Each moment occupies its own distinct position in a temporal series, 
1 and all moments, considered in proper sequence, tell a story of linked events 
moving in a direction" (Gould 1987^0-11).* The ability to apprehend time's 
arrow is central to arguments for how the West became different from the 
rest and began its historical development toward modernity. Time's arrow 
freed the West from the prison of a cyclical view of time and history. A 
distinctly Western historical consciousness, it is argued, develops from the 
radically different sense of time and history created by Christianity's recog-
nition that human history is moving toward salvation, a recognizable end-
point This view, however, has been called into question: "It is often said that 
history comes to be seen as meaningful and goal-directed under the impact 
of Christianity. This is true, but not in the sense in which it is usually meant. 
History comes to be seen as meaningful as a result o f . . . apologetical 
disputes with the non-Christian Greeks and Romans; the idea of history as 
goal-directed is not so much theological as rhetorical" (Press 1982:22). The 
rhetorical force of telos or a goal-directed movement of history does not 
diminish when the religious model is replaced by secular developmental 
sequences, such as social evolutionary frameworks, with different proposed 
or implied endpoints (Burke 2002). 
The privileging of time's arrow and the assumption of a telos become the 
basis for an idea of history, both as an object of study and as a definition of 
how the history of something should be presented. This idea of history can 
be a powerful tool for the elucidation of events and relationships, but it has 
also made it possible to argue that non-Western societies have no sense of 
history because they do not share this particular idea of it or because they do 
not produce appropriately structured narrative accounts of the past (Parmen-
tier 1987; Van de Mieroop iggg). Such an- argument applies not only to 
societies that do not write things down but also to those with a long literary 
tradition. Orientalists, European specialists in the study of South Asia in the 
eighteenth century and nineteenth, dismissed "Indian civilization as being 
ahistorical" (Thapar 2002:181) because they claimed that only one of the 
many written sources of information produced in India over centuries could 
qualify as an example of a historical way of thinking. This deficit meant that 
it was up to the Orientalists to provide that history. 
Time's cycle encapsulates the idea that "events have no meaning as dis-
tinct episodes with causal impact upon a contingent history. . . . Apparent 
motions are parts of repeating cycles, and differences of the past will be 
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realities of the future. Time has no direction" (Gould 1987:11). Premodern 
(or non-Western) peoples are caught in this eternal repetitiveness that pre-
cludes an understanding of time's forward movement, Nora's sempiternal 
practices. Always returned to point zero by their entanglement with the 
natural rhythms of the body, the seasons, or the movement of celestial 
bodies, they find themselves in a situation in which "neither history as a 
whole nor any individual historical event can have any particular meaning or 
value" (Press 1982:7). Instead of events, they experience nothing more than 
the reoccurrence of seemingly eternal forms. The present recapitulates the 
past rather than the past informing an understanding of the present. This 
assumes that repetition means stasis and results in a kind of amnesia caused 
by the lack of anything distinctive to remember. 
Reserving the sequential as the superior framework for history impedes 
understanding of what different models of history and what different kinds 
of historical consciousness might be possible (Herzfeld iggi; Press 1982; 
Rappaport iggo; Riisen 2002). An insistence on sequences and cycles as two 
opposing modes of understanding time also downplays the coexistence of 
sequential and cyclical temporal models in many cultural contexts, including 
Western ones. Scholars attempting to write the history of the Aztec empire 
(ca. 1430-1521 CE) or of how one group of NahuatI speakers, the Mexica, 
came to dominate much of what is now Mexico and Central America have 
been confronted with variant accounts of this history preserved both in 
indigenous forms of recording information and in the roman alphabet in-
troduced by Spanish colonizers.3 These accounts, written by societies con-
quered by the Mexica, allied with them, or successfully resistant to them, 
have proved difficult to reconcile into a single narrative and to attach to a 
firmly dated chronological framework. Several reasons have been put for-
ward to explain the difficulty (Gillespie 1989). It has been argued that Meso-
american peoples are subject to time's cycle rather than to time's arrow, in 
effect reflecting a premodern sense of the relationship between time and 
event. It has also been suggested that the accounts reflect a merging of 
mythical, and historical elements and causes in a way that a modern under-
standing of history rejects; this tendency also afflicted many Spanish writ-
ings, especially those of members of religious orders, who were eager to fit 
Mesoamerica into their own "mythic (religious) universe and millenarian 
traditions (Phelan 1970). 
Rather than assume that time's arrow and cycle are mutually exclusive, 
that sequential chronologies are inherently superior, or that the inclusion of 
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myth renders narrative unhistorical, I consider how these elements help 
make sense of lived experience and memory as part of a process of the 
cultural construction of past, present, and future (Munn rgg2). The value of 
the written documents that have survived lies in their ability to offer one 
insight into a Mesoamerican idea of what history should be, an idea that may 
not match a modern Western idea. Maya hieroglyphic inscriptions and later, 
colonial-era writings by Aztecs and Spaniards share an interest in presenting 
the significant people, relationships, places, nonhuman forces "or entities, 
and events of their own memory communities (Boone igg4a; Gillespie 1.989; 
Leibsohn rgg4; Marcus igg2D). The variation they exhibit suggests that the 
ability to crystallize memory in more permanent form becomes part of the 
attempt to privilege one body of memory over another (Hassig 2001). 
PHILOSOPHIES OF TIME 
Understandings of time in Mesoamerican societies have been most com-
monly approached by looking at the methods these societies developed to 
measure and structure it. The most widespread of these calendars are cycli-
cal in that the elements they recdrd repeat themselves over some period 
of time. Mesoamerican peoples were-aware of and interested in many as-
tronomical cycles, including that of the sun, moon, and the planet Venus. 
The Late Postclassic Mayan book the Dresden Codex contains tables charting 
eclipses and the passage ofVenus (Lounsbury 1983; D;Tedlocki992). One of 
the most important cycles is based on the solar year and has a repeat of 365 
days. The 365 days are divided into 18 months, each with its own name and 
each lasting 20 days, plus a final period of 5 days' duration. One purpose of 
this calendar is to structure agricultural activities such as sowing, but it was 
used primarily to organize a series of small-scale and large-scale, often 
community-wide or statewide religious events (Bricker and Bricker 1988; 
B. Tedlock igg2a). According to the elaborate descriptions in the Florentine 
Codex, compiled in the sixteenth century by the Spanish Franciscan mission-
ary Bernardino de Sahagun with the'help of Nahuatl-speaking students and 
elders, these ceremonies were celebrated in a specific sequence—in specified 
months and at specified times in the month—over the course of the year 
(Sahagun 1953-82; see also Duran 1971; Tozzer 1978). 
A second way of structuring time, one which survived Spanish conquest 
and continues in use today among some Maya in Mexico and Guatemala, is a 
260-day cycle created by combining 20 day names and 13 numbers; this cycle 
is referred to by some scholars as the sacred almanac (Sharer 1994:560-62). 
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Like the 365-day cycle, this one is both sequential and cyclical in that the day 
names follow one another in order, as do the numbers. This means that 
having entered the cycle at any point one knows what the next combination 
will be.4 Achieving a competent understanding of the 260-day calendar is not 
just a matter of grasping the mathematical relationships or of being able to 
move backward and forward as needed from any point in the cycle. Each 
day and each number and their combinations have associated meanings 
(Quinones" Keber iggs; B. Tedlock 1992b; D. Tedlock 1992). The 260-day 
cycle provides a way to keep track of ritual observances that often must take 
place in specific locations and as a way to carry out divination. These seem to 
be rituals and actions of concern to small-scale social groups such as indi-
viduals, families, and households. People who have been specially called and 
trained divine in response to problems and questions brought to them by 
people. The questions are often quite specific and involve marriage, illness, 
and other concerns, but somehow they always work back to people's rela-
tions to a larger world made up of humans and nonhumans, animals, plants, 
corporeal and noncorporeal entities, ancestors, deities, and natural forces, 
the living and the dead. Divination is thus a social act carried out in the 
context of the people involved, the question asked, the day on which the 
question is asked, and other factors (B. Tedlock 1992a, igg2b). 
Peter Furst (1986) has discovered that some contemporary users of the 
260-day system note a similarity between its duration and that of a woman's 
pregnancy. His sources did not claim that the cycle was invented as a way to 
keep track of pregnancy, only that the two could be seen as similar. This 
correspondence is interesting because of the light it sheds on the meaning of 
cycles in the context of everyday life. Over the course of gestation, the passage 
of time is signaled quite obviously by changes in a woman's body, changes 
that'are most apparent to her but are also increasingly evident to those 
around her. These are sequential changes. At the conclusion of the preg-
nancy, with the birth of the child, one could claim that the cycle has returned 
to its starting point and things are exactly as they were before. But this is not 
the case. The social group has been increased by the addition of a new 
individual, whose presence changes'what people"do and how they relate to 
one another. New relationships have come into existence and old ones have 
been redefined. The infant has begun its passage through the life course, an 
experience that is again a sequential series of changes. The mother may seem 
to have returned to a pre-pregnancy state, but her body is no longer the same 
as it was before. Even if this is not her first pregnancy, the physical effects are 
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not identical each time; if anything, they are cumulative. Neither is her social 
identity the same. Cycles are thus as likely to be about transformation as 
about repetition. 
The one form of time measurement that matches our understanding of a 
linear chronological system has been named the Long Count, known to us 
through inscription on permanent media from several areas. Although the 
earliest surviving texts come from the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, it was the 
Maya who used it for the longest period of time. Even they stopped using it 
in the early part of the tenth century CE, and it was not in evidence when the 
Spanish arrived, although the 260-day cycle, the 365-day cycle, and others 
not described here continued to be important. We know most about the 
Long Count from its use by Maya rulers on their monuments. It is the 
existence of these dates that has allowed epigraphers to construct king lists 
for different Maya cities and, by extension, to create a chronological se-
quence for some royal activities (see Grube 2006; Martin and Grube 2000). 
Although the Long Count seems eminently linear to us and appears to reflect 
an understanding of time's arrow, it may also be understood as an extremely 
large-scale example of time's cycle. The Maya saw the Long Count as mea-
suring the passage of time within a very long cycle of years that began in 
their distant past (equivalent to 3114 BCE) and would come to an end in the 
distant future (2012 CE), then to start over again if all went well (Sharer 
1994:567-68). Mesoamerican philosophies of time, in fact, continually 
stress the working out of sequential actions that are also subject to repetition 
that makes them part of smaller-, and larger-scale cycles. 
Histories of the creation of the world further illustrate how sequence and 
cycle form part of the same understanding of event. In the Popol uuh, for 
example, a history of the Quiche- Maya that has come down to us in a 
colonial-era transcription, the gods attempt to create beings that will wor-
ship them. This process requires several attempts. First, the gods create 
beings who are unable to interact properly with the deities because, although 
they make noise, they cannot speak. The gods therefore demote them to 
being the ancestors of the animals who will serve the people to come. The 
deities next make a person out of clay,-who proves incapable of moving or 
speaking or reproducing. This inherently static, unsocial creature is done in 
by the instability of the very material itself. Then the deities try wood, but 
these people, although able to speak and reproduce in a more humanlike 
way, turn out to be too stiff necked to submit to the gods' authority and must 
be destroyed. Finally, the gods decide to use corn and make people out of 
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masa, the dough made from grinding corn with water (D. Tedlock 1996). The 
individuals formed from corn are the ancestors of the Quiche". They are 
"beings who will walk, work, and talk in an articulate and measured way, 
visiting shrines, giving offerings, and calling upon their makers by name, all 
according to the rhythms of [the 260-day] calendar" (D. Tedlock 1^6:32). 
Events and actions, whether, by our standards, mythological or historical, 
religious or political, are in one sense repeated—the gods consult, choose a 
material, fabricate people, observe them, find them deficient, and destroy 
them. Yet no recurrence is identical to its predecessor, being rather a logical 
extension of the earlier state of affairs. The gods consider what has hap-
pened before trying again. They choose different raw materials they hope 
will correct the problems evident in their previous choices. 
It is tempting to see the Long Count as evidence of a temporary shift from 
time's cycle to time's arrow, from premodern cyclicity to something ap-
proaching modern linearity, that for several centuries allowed the Maya to 
somehow surpass their contemporaries and successors in the development 
of a modern understanding of time and history (Pyburn 1998). The cycles, 
however, never disappear during the period in which the Long Count marked 
royal events. The Maya did not abandon cyclical modes of time reckoning, 
including the notation of the corresponding position in the sacred almanac, 
solar year, and lunar month. And the Long Count itself was never free from 
its connection to the very large cycle in which it was embedded. Not all Maya 
cities put up dated monuments,-which suggests that alternative ways of 
keeping track of important genealogies and events existed. This is certainly 
the case for the later Aztec, who did not tie their history to fixed dates 
but nevertheless recorded genealogies and historical narratives that are se-
quences of events and relationships that separate conceptually past action 
from present. 
The Long Count as a mode of defining temporal relationships is closely 
bound to the support of the political actions of certain royal houses. It 
becomes a medium for the construction and dissemination of the royal 
memory community's process of remembering and forgetting, a process 
made possible by the discourse structure of the text and the associated 
imagery (Maxwell 1997). By attempting to limit the use of permanent records 
of these events and their occurrence to certain memory communities, these 
royal houses present their idea of which (and whose) memories should be 
given prominence. For the histories of other memory communities and for 
the rest of the history of these royal communities of memory, one must turn 
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to the ways in which the lived actuality of the everyday becomes a source of 
social memory. 
Everyday life at home creates an appearance of patterned repetition of 
actions and interactions. While not necessarily planned or deliberate, the 
production of repetition is the result not of automata but of people making 
decisions, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, about how to 
use their time, how to expend their energy, how to structure their daily 
interactions with others, and how to interpret what is done. These practices 
are temporal as well as spatial in nature, enacted through the movement of 
the body as it performs its tasks. These actions create a sense of continuity. 
Continuity is often represented as timeless—as the same thing over and 
over—and therefore not productive of memory. This view ignores the dyna-
mism inherent in the actions and interactions of daily life. There seem to be 
two assumptions informing this notion. First, that what is repeated must be 
perceived as the same by the person performing the action and by those 
observing i t And second, that memory must be precise and tied to a codified 
temporal sequence. 
The distinction between time keeping and time telling in imperial China 
affords another way of approaching this issue. Time keeping "allowed the 
government to regulate seasons, months, days, and hours" through horol-
ogy and astronomy, knowledge that was the province of the few, while time 
telling "conveyed a standardized official time to a large population" (Wu 
2003:108). Time telling emphasized patterned rhythms of action. The drum 
tower was the primary means of time telling for many centuries in Chinese 
towns and cities, but it was not a clock. It transmitted information about 
time by making sound at certain points during the day, conveying an "offi-
cial schedule of projected operations and recurring events" (Wu 2003:108). 
Time keeping in Mesoamerica is made possible through the use of multi-
ple calendars that marked the passage of time in 260-day, 365-day, and 
longer intervals. Segmenting time allows the scheduling of practical action 
and religious ceremonies at home and in the plaza (Bricker and Bricker 
rg88; Durdn 1971; B. Tedlock igg2a). Time keeping played a central part 
in the assertion of royal control at Copan by providing a framework for pub-
lic commemorative, religious, and political events. Neither Cerro Palenque 
nor Cuyumapa society were as highly centralized politically or as socially 
differentiated as the kingdom of Copan. Both societies, like Copan, did build 
ballcourts .(see chapters 1 and 7). These monumental arenas suggest a 
means of time telling and its importance since ballgames were played on a 
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schedule that was tied in to calendars and astronomical events (Gillespie 
1991; Joyce, Hendon, and Lopiparo 2009). Calendars were not employed 
only by the state. The 3 65-day calendar was also of concern to people be-
cause of the relationship between date of birth, one's destiny, and person-
hood (see chapter 5). Perhaps even more central to individuals and their 
immediate circle was the 260-day cycle. Curing illness, deciding whom to 
marry, and mourning the dead are examples of concerns that would loom 
large in the life of people at all levels of society. Divination is integral to these 
concerns and would have taken place either in a domestic setting or at sacred 
places in the larger social and geographic landscape (Boone 1983; Brown 
2000; Brown, Simmons, and Sheets 2002; Duran ig7r; Tozzer 1978; Sa-
hagun 1953-82; B. Tedlock 1992a; D. Tedlock igg3; Viesca Trevifio 2001). 
The ability to deploy the 260-day calendar in this way comes from spe-
cialized training and the mastery of a specific body of knowledge integrated 
with the study of ceremonial and medical knowledge. Such expertise was not 
restricted to the elite or to those holding high political or religious office, 
although it does seem that status distinctions separated the specialists. 
No evidence has been found in the societies I study here of any official 
means of time telling comparable to the Chinese drum tower's ongoing in-
tervention in daily life, an intervention made possible by the nature of Chi-
nese cities. However, the perceptual aspects of the periodic, often daily 
actions that take place in the domestic space of the residential compounds— 
particularly the combination of sights, sounds, and smells attendant on 
these actions—provide a form of time telling that, while not controlled 
by a centralized authority, nevertheless produced a rhythm by which resi-
dents scheduled their lives' and provided a framework around which mem-
ory grows. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING 
I have exhausted the usefulness of the two angles of vision discussed so far. 
Memory is not just an individual faculty or social property. Neither is it the 
poor relation of history, emblematic of a premodern mindset incapable of 
thinking historically. It is time to turn this thing we removed from the 
offering bowl so as to achieve a more productive perspective on memory. 
The new angle I propose to explore in the chapters that follow argues that 
"memory is best conceived of in verb form" (Hirst and Manier ig95:iog). 
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Memory is remembering-and forgetting and thus changes from a static 
object to an interactive and intersubjective process that forms part of Han-
dler's historical action, "stretched across individuals and the wider social 
and cultural environment that they inhabit" (Cole 2001:29). Memory is not 
something people have but something they do. People interact with one 
another and are bound together in webs of social relations. These relations 
and interactions may be transitory or enduring, connected to situations that 
are unlikely to ever be repeated or which recur over and over, even beyond the 
life span of any individual participant. 
Recognizing that memory does not reside only in the mind, waiting to be 
retrieved from some neurological equivalent of the Roman orator's memory 
palace or the computational model's hard drive, frees one to consider how 
the inescapable sociality of human beings undermines any simplistic equa-
tion of the individual and remembering. At the same time, dismantling the 
reification of social groups as bounded and unchanging entities allows one 
to reconfigure them as collections of people connected through practice and 
meaningful interaction. Identity and memory are practices that are con-
stituted and reconstituted over time, practices that involve forgetting vof 
certain aspects of history as much as celebrating others. This makes them 
potent political forces. The promulgation of memory may become an at-
tempt to impose someone's preferred narrative or to elevate some group's 
social memory to the level of the official (Bodnar 1992; Cole 2001; Forty 
1999; Koshar 2000; Levinson 1998; Nora rgg6; Prost 1997; Tai 2001). This is 
in fact part of what elites do, not just through written texts but also through 
performances and how they live their lives. They wish to elevate particular 
genealogies and sequences of events over others (see, e.g., Kan 1989). Such 
exercises in legitimation are often associated with attempts to maintain 
social hierarchy (Cressy 1994; Gillis igg4) or with colonialism (Rappaport 
iggo; Thapar 2002), where they have been analyzed as attempts to impose a 
cultural hegemony (Comaroffand Comaroff 1992). 
No matter how insistent the voice of elite or official memory, however, the 
"multiplicity of social identities" guarantees "the co-existence of rival mem-
ories, alternative memories" which reflect "different views about what is 
significant or 'worthy of memory'" (Burke 1989:107). I adopt Peter Burke's 
term memory communities to refer to groups that coalesce around bodies of 
memory. Thus memory communities are also communities of practice in 
which learning takes place and knowledge is constructed (Lave and Wenger 
1991; Wenger 1998). From this vantage point, the fact that the residents of 
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some domestic places claim to endure over generations results from the 
social, political, or economic consequences of these shared practices rather 
than from the group's achieving some kind of transcendent life independent 
of the people who reproduce it through practice. Furthermore, the multi-
plicity of narratives present in Mesoamerican societies offers a glimpse of 
the accommodations with and resistance to such attempts to sustain a cul-
tural hegemony, whether through religion, conquest, exchange, and all the 
other forms of coercion and co-optation practiced by those attempting to 
acquire and hold on to power. At the same time, these narratives allow an 
anthropological analysis of memory, history, and historical consciousness as 
cultural categories. 
I have been most concerned here with demonstrating how different ap-
proaches to memory converge on remembering and forgetting as interper-
sonal and intersubjective, embedded in the web of human sociality. I have 
argued that memory and identity are intersubjective, situated in spatial, 
temporal, and social contexts and created through practice—constituted and 
reconstituted through historical action. I have suggested that we think in 
terms of multiple memory communities interacting with one another, an 
approach that provides a way to consider the political economy of memory, 
an economy based on remembering and forgetting that is strategic and also 
a potential source of conflict as well as of productive connection. Remem-
11 bering and forgetting are embodied and contextualized social practices that 
J' are intimately bound up with materiality. It is through an intensive and 
:i" ] ongoing engagement with •materiality that people do the work of memory 
„ It across time and space. 
" 1 It is precisely the inextricability of this connection that makes it possible 
to approach the study of memory communities by way of their material 
remains. As practices, ±ey are externalized onto objects that have an exis-
tence separate from ourselves, engrained in the body, and dependent on 
context (Hirst and Manier 1995). My reason for considering the activities, 
material world, and interactions of people living together in such depth is 
that by attending to these elements as components of a constituting process 
of social practice, I can rethink ritual, daily life, artifacts, art, and burials (to 
name some of the most heavily studied archaeological domains) as integral 
components of social practice. 1 
I have mentioned what could be considered to be different kinds of 
memory, first individual and social, then intersubjective. In the following 
chapters I expand intersubjectivity to include embodied remembering and 
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relations with personlike objects. That different ways of remembering and 
different kinds of memory may be possible is explored as part of my discus-
sion throughout the rest of the' book. I have deliberately avoided presenting a 
typology of memory because such an approach tends to produce categories 
that must be treated as dichotomous and discrete in order to justify their 
differentiation. As my review of the individual-social memory distinction 
and the linear-cyclical time opposition makes clear, typologies obscure con-
nections. I am interested in determining how diverse modes or ways of 
remembering interact. Rather than state a priori that memory can or should 
be divided into categories, with the concomitant developmental or socio-
logical implications such a statement would carry, I prefer to use the detailed 
exploration of domestic life in the valleys of Copan and Cuyumapa and at the 
site of Cerro Palenque in the Ulua river valley as an opportunity to consider 
when and how particular modes become salient. The ways in which mean-
ing is constructed through action, semiotics, materiality, perception, and 
sensation are applied to the material world in which the people in Copan, 
Cerro Palenque, and Cuyumapa embedded themselves. 
My discussion now moves to the relationship between materiality, iden-
tity, and memory in order to grapple seriously with the interaction between 
practices, object domains, and how memory develops in multiple social 
venues. I point to the importance of understanding how memory commu-
nities assert connections between memories and identity in ways that bring 
the past into the present. Several processes are central to this endeavor. One 
is that action and interaction create society, which does not have an ab-
stracted or reified existence separate from the practices that constitute it. A 
second is the active and formative role of material objects in how people 
make meaning and understand their subjectivity. Chapter i introduces the 
three societies in detail and discusses the material traces of life in three river 
valleys and their larger historical context. I also consider residential space as 
meaningful places inhabited by communities of practice, drawing on an-
thropological studies of place and phenomenological studies of perception. 
In chapter 2 I examine research on the relationship between people and 
objects to consider how memory and identity intersect with multiple object 
domains to create contexts for remembering and forgetting at different 
social and spatial scales. Objects can be like persons. They can act as social 
agents, participants in relationships, and subjects in their own right. In 
chapter 2 I draw on Alfred Gell's discussion of the enchantment of some 
kinds of objects and Daniel Miller's on the humility of others to underscore 
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that objects, such as monuments, are not fossilized memories or static 
repositories. Work on ephemeral monuments argues instead that objects 
play a central role in remembering and forgetting because of their ability to 
facilitate and shape the recall of something absent. 
In chapter 31 bring together the discussion of places and communities of 
practice in the first chapter with the treatment of materiality in chapter 2 to 
expand understanding of how people living together become a memory 
community, always mindful that other memory communities exist as well. 
This discussion requires the crossing of conventional analytic boundaries to 
bring together practices that are integral to everyday life and those consid-
ered to be ritual in nature: the burying of people or caches of objects, the 
building-of houses, and the storing of food. The reopening of burials, the 
rearrangement of caches, the frequent rebuilding of houses, and the con-
stant putting in and taking out of goods from storage containers are dy-
namic processes that make the past part of the daily lives of the living 
through selective remembering and forgetting. 
In chapter 41 look at the relationship between memory, knowledge, and 
learning. I focus on doing and making, confounding the traditional archae-
ological separation between domestic or subsistence activities, such as food 
preparation, and craft production, such as Weaving cloth, in order to reorient 
the discussion toward the importance of productive action to an intersubjec-
tive, embodied identity. I address questions of identity in greater depth in 
chapter 5 through a discussion of relational personhood. I present individ-
ual identity as the result of social relations and situations involving people 
and objects to support further my argument that memory in these societies 
cannot be assumed to enshrine a single narrative of events or take a constant 
point of view. 
In chapters 6 and 7 I discuss periodic ceremonies that provide another 
context for the construction of social memory. In chapter 6 the text stays 
rooted in domestic space as it explores the implications of the celebration of 
important events that make up the history of ± e coresident community 
of practice. The emphasis is on feasting as a "total social phenomenon" 
(Mauss iggo:3) that presents opportunities for interaction among groups of 
people belonging to different communities of memory and, in the process, 
for the reinforcement of a local sense of identity. The next chapter intro-
duces another setting, that of the ballcourt. JSallcourts, although a spe-
cialized kind of architectural construction with the specific purpose of pro-
viding a venue for the playing of the ballgame, have close connections with 
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domestic space in pre-Hispanic Honduras. They are also a form of monu-
mental construction common to all three societies studied here. Like feast-
ing, the ballgame is best viewed as a kind of umbrella term subsuming a 
series of activities, events, and interactions, including dancing, sacrificing, 
eating and drinking, processions, and dramatic or comedic performances as 
well as the games themselves, that together create a riveting spectacle. I sum 
up my discussion in the conclusion, in which I return to some of the larger 
issues raised here. 
